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CLOSING THE EVIDENTIARY GAP: A
REVIEW OF CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS
ANALYZING FEDERAL BLACK LUNG
PRESUMPTIONS OF ENTITLEMENT
HENRY L. STEPHENS, JR.*
ALVA A. HOLLON, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Coal workers pneumoconiosis (CWP), perhaps the most in-
sidious of hazards attendant to coal mining, was compensible
under only a few state workers compensation programs until
the last decade. As a result, in 1969, Congress enacted remedial
legislation embodied in Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
& Safety Act1 designed to afford benefits to disabled miners and
to the survivors of deceased miners.
As with any seminal legislative effort, the 1969 Act was the
product of numerous converging ideas, including the widely held
belief that only 50,000 miners were disabled by CWP.2 Also play-
ing a major role in the focus of the 1969 Act was the feeling that
the 50,000 potential beneficiaries of the federal black lung legis-
lation consisted primarily of individuals no longer employed in
the coal industry.' As a consequence, the thrust of the 1969 Act
was to pay these existing claims with funds provided by the
federal government4 and thereby eradicate what was conceived
as an aberational social problem characterized by the physical
*B.A., Western Kentucky University, 1971; J.D., University of Kentucky,
1975; Assistant Professor of Law, Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University.
**B.A., Rollins College, 1968; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1974; Member of
the firm, Hollon, Hollon and Hollon, Hazard, Ky. Grateful appreciation is hereby
extended to Kathleen L. Patterson, a third year student at the University of Ken-
tucky College of Law for her research assistance.
30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941 (1970) [hereinafter, the 1969 Act].
2 H.R. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1969).
Kilcullen, Compensation Benefits for Coal Miners Under the Federal Black
Lung Program, THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT, 213 PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE 159, 162 (1979).
H.R. REP. No. 761 supra note 2 at 50-52.
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and economic suffering of a relatively small number of miners.
As a result, this initial legislation creating the federal black lung
program vested administrative responsibilities in the Social
Security Administration evidencing Congressional intent that
the program be administered in an essentially non-adversarial
setting. To reduce traditional evidentiary hurdles in establish-
ing entitlement to benefits, the legislation created three
statutory presumptions of entitlement.'
From these modest beginnings, amendments embodied in
the Black Lung Benefits Act of 19726 and the Black Lung Bene-
fits Reform Act of 1977' have expanded the initial program to a
full-fledged workers compensation program which has awarded
benefits to 500,000 miners and their dependents. The federal
program is currently paying claims in amounts exceeding sixty
million dollars per month."-' Further, each of these amendments,
finding its respective origin in the inadequacies of the earlier
legislation, added an additional presumption of entitlement of
benefits -thereby greatly liberalizing the mechanisms available
for establishing total disability or death due to CWP.
This article will analyze those decisions of the circuit courts
of appeals during the past decade which ruled upon the quantity
and quality of medical evidence needed to invoke these statu-
tory presumptions of entitlement. Although many of the cases
discussed herein rule upon the propriety of administrative ad-
judications on claims filed prior to July 1, 1973, those cases have
a present viability since they are based on the statutory pre-
sumptions of entitlement embodied in the regulations presently
being utilized by the Department of Labor, Office of Workers
Compensation Programs.8 As a result, these decisions provide
guidance to the Department of Labor and the Benefits Review
Board in the course of adjudicating entitlement issues presented
in pending and future claims.
See 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(1)-921(c)(3) (1970).
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 [codified
at 30 U.S.C. § 901] (amended 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Amendments].
' Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (to
be codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Reform Act].
1.1 Black Lung deficit at $1.1 billion, Ky. Coal J., April, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.302-718.306 (1980). The obligation to adjudicate
claims filed after June 30, 1973 befalls the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 30
U.S.C § 925 (1976).
[Vol. 83
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While not attempting to analyze every issue that may arise
under these statutory presumptions, this article will analyze a
variety of recurring problems present in establishing entitle-
ment to these presumptions or, in the alternative, rebutting or
defeating the operation of such presumptions. Initially, a discus-
sion of the circuit court cases construing the presumptions em-
bodied in the original 1969 Act will be undertaken followed by a
treatment of the respective presumptions enacted as a result of
both amendments to that Act. In this way, the rationale for, and
necessity of, the presumptions contained in the amending legis-
lation can best be understood.
I. THE 30 U.S.C. SECTION 921(c)(1) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A. Purpose
The presumption set forth in 30 U.S.C. section 921(c)(1)9
originated in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969.10 This presumption was created to enable a coal miner
with at least ten years of coal mine employment to establish a
causal relationship between his CWP and his coal mine employ-
ment when seeking federal black lung benefits.11 While super-
ficially, section 921(c)(1) appears to be a causality presumption
relating chronic lung disease such as CWP to length of coal mine
employment, the two regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Health, Education & Welfare (now Health & Human Services)
have given this presumption a dual effect in black lung cases.
The first regulation provides that if the claimant was
employed for ten or more years in a coal mine and is suffering
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1970) provides that: ... if a miner who is suffering or
suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or more
underground coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumo-
coniosis arose out of such employment ... "
10 See note 1 supra.
II This statutory section was held constitutional in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). The regulation, which implements 30 U.S.C. §
921(c)(1) appears at 20 C.F.R. § 410.416 (1980) and provides as follows:
(a) If a miner was employed for 10 or more years in the Nation's
coal mines, and is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be
presumed, in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, that
the pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.
(b) In any other case, a miner who is suffering or suffered from
pneumoconiosis, must submit the evidence necessary to establish that
the pneumoconiosis arose out of employment in the Nation's coal mines.
1981]
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from CWP, it is presumed that the CWP was caused by the mine
employment.'2 Conversely, if the claimant fails to establish the
requisite years of employment in the mines, he must then es-
tablish the causal connection between his disability and his coal
mine employment.'" The second regulation affecting the section
921(c)(1) presumption is the so-called interim presumption." This
Id. at § (a).
13 Id. at § (b).
" 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Interim Presumption. With respect to a miner who files a
claim for benefits before July 1, 1973, and with respect to a survivor of
a miner who dies before January 1, 1974, when such survivor timely
files a claim for benefits, such miner will be presumed to be totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or to have been totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis at the time of his death, or his death will be presumed
to be due to pneumoconiosis, as the case may be, if:
(1) One of the following medical requirements is met:
(i) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autop-
sy establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis ... ; or
(ii) In the case of a miner employed for at least 15
years in underground or comparable coal mine em-
ployment, ventilatory studies establish the presence
of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease ... as
demonstrated by values which are equal to or less
than the values specified in the following table:
Equal to or less than-
[miner's height in inches] FEV1  and MVV*






73" or more; and 2.7 108
(2) The impairment established in accordance with para-
graph (b)(1) of this section arose out of coal mine employ-
ment ....
(3) With respect to a miner who meets the medical require-
ments in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section, he will be pre-
sumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising
out of coal mine employment, or to have been totally disabled
at the time of his death due to pneumoconiosis arising out of
such employment, or his death will be presumed to be due to
pneumocuniosis arising out of such employment, as the case
[Vol. 83
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provision arose out of congressional discontent with the backlog
of claims.,
In 1972, apparently dissatisfied with the manner in which
the Secretary of HEW was processing claims for black lung
benefits, Congress enacted several liberalizing amendments af-
fecting the administration of section 921(c)(1). 6 The legislative
history to the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 demonstrates
Congress' desire to ensure that miners with less than fifteen
years of coal mine employment, who suffer from simple CWP,
would constitute "worthy cases" and thus be eligible for bene-
fits under the amendments."
In response to this congressional mandate, the Secretary
issued a regulation embodying an interim presumption18 with
less stringent medical criteria. In order for a living miner to
qualify for the interim presumption, his claim for benefits must
have been filed prior to July 1, 1973.19 Such a claimant can es-
tablish entitlement to benefits if a chest X-ray or lung biopsy
establishes CWP or if pulmonary function studies meet certain
medical criteria set forth in the regulations. 2 A miner with at
least ten years of coal mine employment who meets the pulmon-
ary function values set forth in the regulation is presumed to be
may be, if he has at least 10 years of the requisite coal mine
employment.
(c) Rebuttal of Presumption. The presumption in paragraph (b) of
this section may be rebutted if:
(1) There is evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing his
usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work ... or
(2) Other evidence, including physical performance tests
(where such tests are available and their administration is
not contraindicated), establish that the individual is able to
do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work....
*"FEV1" stands for one second forced expiratory volume and "MVV" stands for
maximum volumtary ventilation. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.426(b) (1980). See also Lapp,
A Lawyer's Medical Guide To Black Lung Litigation, supra this issue.
"5 For the Legislative History of the 1972 Amendments, see S. REP. No.
92-743, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2305-37 [hereinafter cited as 1972 Legislative History].
11 1972 Legislative History, Id. at 2305-06.
17 Id- at 2317.
II See note 14 supra at § (b).
19 Id.
I Id. at §§ (b)(1)(i), (ii).
19811
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totally disabled due to CWP.2 Once the claimant has established
entitlement to this interim presumption, it may be rebutted only
by showing that the miner is doing his usual coal mine work, or
comparable and gainful work, or "other evidence" establishes
that he is able to engage in such work.'
Thus, under the 1972 Amendments, the section 921(c)(1) pre-
sumption assists an applicant for black lung benefits' in two
ways: (a) by establishing a causal connection between CWP and
coal mine employment and (b) by providing an interim presump-
tion for claims filed prior to July 1, 1973, utilizing less stringent
entitlement criteria than that contained in the primary stan-
dards.'
B. The Interim Presumption
There are relatively few appellate cases which turn upon an
interpretation of section 921(c)(1). This is apparently due to
either the mechanical application of the interim presumption, or
the ability of claimants to convince an administrative law judge
(ALJ) that they have fifteen or more years of coal mining ex-
perience, thus entitling them to the more advantageous pre-
sumption set forth in 30 U.S.C. section 921(c)(4).' However,
several appellate cases do provide an overview of the operation
of this presumption.
Sullivan v. Califanol illustrates the ease with which the in-
terim presumption can be mechanically applied. The claimant
was an underground miner with approximately ten years of coal
mine employment. Benefits were denied by both the ALJ and
the Appeals Council; the denial was affirmed by the district
court. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, there was no contention
that the X-ray evidence was sufficient under the interim pre-
sumption." The only other basis to support an award of benefits
was two pulmonary function studies; the first performed in
January, 1973, the second in July, 1975." While the second study
21 Id. at § (b)(3).
Id. at § (c).
Compare the standards of 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(ii) (1980) with the more
stringent cirteria of 20 C.F.R. § 410.426(b) (1980).
" See text accompanying notes 152-191 infra.
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was performed two years after the jurisdictional cut-off date of
June 30, 1973, the court nevertheless considered the later report
on the strength of Begley v. Mathews,' which held that evi-
dence adduced after the cut-off date may nevertheless be rele-
vant in establishing the existence of a disability before that
date.
At the administrative level, the Secretary of HEW had
evaluated the 1975 pulmonary function study and had concluded
that the results were based upon inconsistent effort by the
claimant. Therefore, the 1975 study would not support an award.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that this finding was supported by
substantial evidence and affirmed the denial of benefits. Thus,
Sullivan demonstrates how medical evidence can be mechani-
cally analyzed to deny benefits under the interim presumption.
On the other hand, Dickson v. Califano0 demonstrates the
manner in which the mechanistic approach of the interim pre-
sumption aids claimants in establishing entitlement. In support
of his claim, Dickson introduced pulmonary function studies and
a report from a board certified radiologist who had interpreted
the claimant's chest X-rays as positive for CWP.Y However, the
claimant failed to convince the ALJ that he had at least ten
years of coal mine employment. As a result, the ALJ, the Ap-
peals Council, and the district court all denied the claimant the
benefit of the interim presumption.
The manner in which the Sixth Circuit resolved the issue of
length of employment is instructive. While the ALJ gave con-
siderable weight to Dickson's annual wages during periods when
wages were low," the Sixth Circuit tallied the claimant's calen-
dar quarters of employment. Finding, from Social Security
wage records," forty-three calendar quarters of employment,
the court ruled that ten years of mine employment had been de-
monstrated.'
544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976). cert denied 430 U.S. 985 (1977).
617 F.2d at 1216.
590 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1979).
S, Id. at 621-22.
, Id. at 620.
42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(1)(A) (1970), which defines one year for HEW purposes.
" 590 F.2d at 618-21. At no time did the Court express an opinion as to the
minimal amount of earnings a miner has to prove during each quarter for which
he is given credit for coal mine employment.
1981]
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Once it was determined that Dickson's coal mine employment
was sufficient to entitle him to the interim presumption, the
court next concluded that he suffered from a chronic lung
disease. 5 The claimant's medical evidence was analyzed in light
of the interim presumption. Of the three sets of pulmonary
function studies introduced, only the one conducted in 1975
would have qualified the claimants for benefits. While this test
would have justified an award of benefits subsequent to 1975,11
it 'was not proof positive of disability prior to July 1, 1973.11
However, Dickson's X-ray evidence provided a basis for award-
ing benefits prior to 1975.
The chest X-ray interpreted as positive by a board certified
radiologist was held sufficient to entitle the claimant to
benefits under the interim presumption, notwithstanding subse-
quent negative interpretations. In so holding, the court retroac-
tively applied section 5 of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act
of 1977.1' That section prohibits the Secretary of Labor from re-
reading an X-ray initially interpreted as positive for CWP if: the
X-ray is of readable quality, there is no evidence of fraud, and
other evidence demonstrates that the claimant suffers from a
pulmonary or respiratory impairment.0 As a consequence, the
Id. at 622.
See note 14 supra.
590 F.2d at 621.
See Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 430 U.S.
985 (1977). A remand would have been necessary to make this determination. See,
e.g. Zielinski v. Califano, 580 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1978); Paluso v. Mathews, 573 F.2d
4 (10th Cir. 1978); Ingram v. Califano, 547 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Reform Act, supra note 7 at § 5. This section provides in part:
... In any case in which there is other evidence that a miner has a
pulmonary or respiratory impairment, the Secretary shall accept a
board certified or board eligible radiologist's interpretation of a chest
roentgenogram which is of a quality sufficient to demonstrate the
presence of pneumoconiosis submitted in support of a claim for benefits
under this title if such roentgenogram has been taken by a radiologist
or qualified technician, except where the Secretary has reason to
believe that the claim has been fraudulently represented. In order to in-
sure that any such roentgenogram is of adequate quality to demon-
strate the presence of pneumoconiosis, and in order to provide for
uniform quality in the roentgenograms, the Secretary of Labor may, by
regulation, establish specific requirements for the techniques used to
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subsequent negative interpretation rendered by a radiologist
chosen by the Secretary of HEW was discredited by the court in
Dickson.4'
Having determined claimant was entitled to the benefit of
the interim presumption, the court examined whether the evi-
dence of record was sufficient to rebut the presumption.42 As
provided in the interim presumption, rebuttal may only be
achieved by discounting the evidence of disability.4" Since the
ALJ had conceded that Dickson was disabled," this was a moot
point.
In summary, the court in Dickson went to great lengths to
find a basis on which to support an award of benefits. Indeed,
the court was eager to apply the 1977 Reform Act retroactively
to this pending Part B claim which was originally filed in 1971."'
While retroactive application of the Reform Act to a pending
Part B case has been severely criticized,4" Dickson's "a single
X-ray" theory, nevertheless, represents a literal interpretation
of the precise language employed in the interim presumption.
A simpler illustration of entitlement to benefits resulting
from the operation of the interim presumption is Whitman v.
Califano." Seeking entitlement to the interim presumption, a
miner with twenty-four years of underground coal mining ex-
" For critiism by claimants of the Secretary of HEW's practice of rereading
chest X-ray films, see, Hill v. Califano, 592 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 1979); for
judicial criticism see Stewart v. Mathews, 412 F. Supp. 235, 238 (W.D. Va. 1975).
It should be noted that in the writer's experience, X-ray readers chosen by the
Secretary of HEW seldom, if ever, made any comment on the form provided by
the Secretary which requested an explanation as to why another physician inter-
preted the same chest X-ray positive and the reviewing physician interpreted the
X-ray film negative.
11 590 F.2d at 623.
Id. See note 14 at §§ (c)(1), (2) supra.
" 590 F.2d at 621.
" Id. at 618. Part B claims are those claims for benefits filed on or before
Dec. 31, 1973.
" Compare Miniard v. Califano, 618 F.2d 405 (6th Cr. 1980) (supporting
retroactive application of the 1977 amendments), with Freeman v. Califano, 600
F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979); Yakim v. Califano, 587 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1978), and
Treadway v. Califano, 584 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1978) (criticizing retroactive applica-
tion of the 1977 amendments).
4 617 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980).
1981]
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perience introduced two chest X-rays that had been initially in-
terpreted by "B" readers 8 as positive for CWP. When the
Secretary of HEW had the same filmes re-read by other "B"
readers, the X-rays were interpreted as negative." The claimant
then submitted positive reports by still another "B" reader who
had re-read the same films.'
In addition, three examining physicians found a pulmonary
impairment. However, a board certified internist employed by
the Secretary of HEW reviewed the tests conducted by one ex-
amining physician and concluded that the tests showed no pul-
monary impairment. After considering this evidence, the ALJ
denied benefits as a result of conflicting X-ray interpretation,
the failure of timely pulmonary function studies to produce
qualifying results, and the failure of other evidence to indicate a
totally disabling respiratory impairment."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that, since Whit-
man had filed a claim prior to July 1, 1973, he was entitled to
benefits if he satisfied the interim presumption. 2 In setting up a
program under which physicians read and interpreted chest
- 42 C.F.R. §§ 37.51-.52 (1980) set up a hierarchy of proficiency for physicians
who desire to be certified by the Social Security Administration as readers of coal
miners' X-rays. A physician desiring to be certified as a first or "A" reader must
submit six sample X-rays two of which he shall have diagnosed as showing no
pneumoconiosis, two showing simple pneumoconiosis and two showing com-
plicated pneumoconiosis. In addition, such physician must have completed a
course in examining coal miners' X-rays specified by the Social Security Ad-
ministration.
To attain the status of a final or "B" reader, additional proficiency above that
required for an "A" reader must be demonstrated by taking and passing a
specifically designed proficiency examination. Thus these regulations provide
that the interpretation of a "B" reader is final and controlling over an "A"
reader's interpretation.
" The practice of having "B" readers reread the X-rays initially interpreted
positive by "A" readers was highly condemned as "administrative one upsman-
ship" in a variety of forums. See, e.g., Stewart v. Mathews, 412 F. Supp. 235
(W.D. Va. 1975). This practice, however, was held not to violate due process per
se in Hill v. Califano, 592 F.2d 341, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, 30 U.S.C.
§ 923(b) (1979) now provides that a board certified or board eligible radiologist's
determination that an X-ray shows CWP is binding on the Secretary in the
absence of fraud if coupled with "other evidence that [the] miner has a pulmonary
or respiratory impairment ... 
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X-ray films for use in black lung cases, the Secretary pro-
mulgated the regulations providing for final readers of X-rays
who are labelled "B" readers. 3 The regulations provide that if a
"B" reader initially interprets a chest X-ray film to reveal CWP,
this interpretation is final and binding upon the Secretary of
HEW.A Although this system of classification of X-ray readers
has come under attack by claimants,.5 the court in Whitman ap-
proved this classification. Since this classification system does
not provide for a hierarchy of "B" readers, the court ruled the
Secretary must accept the first "B" reader's interpretation.57
Therefore, since the first "B" reader's positive interpretation
established Whitman's entitlement to the interim presumption,
and there was no evidence in the record by which the Secretary
could rebut the presumption, Whitman was awarded benefits. 8
C. Establishing Years of Coal Mine Employment
While Sullivan,9 Dickson,"5 and Whitman" deal with the in-
terim presumption, Cantrell v. Califano,62 involves a claimant's
attempt to utilize the section 921(c)(1) presumption to establish a
causal link between CWP and coal mine employment. Cantrell's
only mining employment was during an eight year period be-
tween 1934 and 1942. From 1942 to 1959, he worked in various
non-mining jobs where he was exposed to "coal, coke, charcoal
and lime."' X-rays introduced in support of his claim had been
interpreted as positive for CWP, and the ALJ who heard the
evidence awarded benefits. However, in reversing the award,
the Appeals Council found that the claimant's non-mining jobs
are known to have precipitated black lung diseases such as
CWP.0 4 Since Cantrell had fewer than ten years employment in
" See note 48 supra.
Ul d.
See, e.g., Vintson v. Califano, 592 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1979); Hill v. Calffano,
592 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1979).
1 617 F.2d at 1057.
" Ii
617 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1980).
a 590 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1979).
", 617 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980).
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the coal mines, he had the burden of establishing the causal con-
nection between his CWP and his coal mine employment. 5
On appeal, the claimant failed to submit any evidence that
contradicted the Appeals Council's finding that his non-mining
job could cause diseases such as CWP. Thus, despite a finding
that Cantrell suffered from CWP, he failed to establish a causal
relationship between his CWP and his coal mine work. Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the denial of benefits and based its
holding on this failure.6 Thus, in many cases a finding of at least
ten yeafs of coal mine employment is crucial since this finding is
the sine qua non of entitlement to the section 921(c)(1) presump-
tion.
For those miners employed after passage of the Social
Security Act in 1935,7 for better or worse as the case may be,
the miner's wage records play an important role in establishing
his coal mine employment. In fact, when an individual's Social
Security wage records are blank as to a period of time the in-
dividual claims to have worked for an employer, the records are
"presumptive evidence"" that no such wages were paid for the
period in question. The question then arises as to both the
amount and kind of proof an individual must introduce to sub-
stantially dispute the presumptive validity of the Social Securi-
ty wage records.
20 C.F.R. § 410.416(b) (1980). See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
578 F.2d at 551. A similar case which stands for the same proposition is
Beck v. Mathews, 601 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the claimant could not
prove 10 years of coal mine employment. In addition, he had worked about 20
years in a foundry.
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 405-32 (1976).
Id. § 405(c)(4)(B).
'" Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1971) held that a claimant
seeking Social Security disbility benefits need only prove her case by preponder-
ance of the evidence. In so doing, the court noted that Congress obviously did not
intend to penalize wage earners for the carelessness or dishonesty of their
employers. Moreover, the claimant offered other valid reasons for the absence of
entries in her wage records. Some of her employers were no longer in business,
and some employers had previously discarded old records.
The claimant's proof of employment consisted of testimony and affidavits of
friends, relatives, co-workers and the wife of a former employer. While the ALJ
rejected this evidence based on "his distrust for the testimony of 'friends and kin-
folks;'" the court stated that "neither the statute, the regulations, nor common
sense disqualifies [relative and friends] from testifying." Furthermore, the court
noted that the statute and regulations did not require witnesses to establish ex-
act amounts and dates. For other cases discussing this presumption regarding
social security wage records, see Annot., 28 A.L.R. FED. 395 (1976).
[Vol. 83
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Contesting the validity of Social Security wage records is
addressed in Maxey v. Califano.0 The claimant alleged fifteen
years of coal mine employment, but his Social Security wage
records revealed only two years of such employment. In support
of his claim, Maxey submitted four affidavits of fellow workers
at his hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ evaluated only one of
the affidavits and found that the affiant alleged working with
the claimant regularly during a certain period when the claim-
ant testified he had worked only on a sporadic basis."' Because of
this inconsistency the ALJ denied benefits.
The claimant then requested a review by the Appeals Coun-
cil and submitted affidavits of five additional fellow workers.
The Appeals Council upheld the denial of benefits without any
evaluation of the affidavits regarding claimant's coal mine
employment.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court remanded the
case for further proof, since the Secretary of HEW had the obli-
gation to "consider all relevant evidence." 2 Since the Appeals
Council had failed to evaluate the affidavits and to provide a
reason for disregarding them, the court refused to uphold the
denial of benefits.
As a subsidiary point, the court, in a footnote," criticized the
Secretary's apparent misinterpretation of 20 C.F.R. section
410.416(b) which requires that a miner submit evidence to es-
tablish that his CWP arose out of coal mine employment where
he has less than ten years of employment in the mines. 4 Since
Maxey failed to establish at least ten years of coal mine employ-
ment, the Secretary presumed that the causal connection be-
tween coal mining and a chronic lung condition could not be es-
tablished. The court rejected this interpretation stating that
there was absolutely no support for this view. The court noted
that when a claimant has less than ten years of coal mine em-
ployment his other employment history is indeed probative. If
he had worked in a dusty environment which could have precipi-
tated a chronic lung disease such as CWP, this factor could
7' 598 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 Id. at 876.
72 Id. citing Arnold v. Sec'y, HEW, 567 F.2d 258, 259 (4th Cir. 1977).
1 Id. at 876 n.3.
1' See note 11 supra.
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serve to defeat his claim, as occurred in Cantrell.5 On the other
hand, if non-mining employment did not expose him to dusty
conditions, this would support an argument that his breathing
problem was related to his coal mining.
D. Who is a Miner?
A final issue arising within the context of the section
921(c)(1) presumption concerns the identity of claimants-to
whom does the term "coal miner" apply? This issue was addressed
in Freeman v. Califano.78 Although the ALJ conceded that the
claimant's disability was due to CWP, he found that Freeman
had not proved that his disability was due to coal mine employ-
ment. In other words, the causal connection between his CWP
and his coal mine employment was lacking;"7 thus, benefits were
denied.
While Freeman had engaged in actual coal mining for only
five years, he alleged six additional years of employment by a
railroad in the vicinity of a coal mine. If his railroad work
qualified, he would be entitled to the presumption of causation
embodied in the regulations.78
The ALJ ruled that only underground coal mining was
covered by the Act; therefore, railroad work which was all
above ground could not be included. This analysis was prompted
by the original thrust of the 1969 Act, but the 1972 Black Lung
Benefits Act deleted the word "underground", making the
ALJ's interpretation clearly erroneous. 79
The district court affirmed denial of benefits on other
grounds. Although the district court's rationale is unclear, it ap-
parently attached some significance to the claimant's employ-
ment by a railroad at a time he claimed exposure to coal dust."
However, the Fifth Circuit found no support in either the Act or
regulations for this restrictive view. While recognizing that
railroad work is not the same as "extracting" or "preparing" the
'5 578 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 62-66.
7' 600 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979).
" See note 11 supra.
78 Id
' 600 F.2d at 1059. See also 1972 Legislature History, supra note 15 at 2326.
' 600 F.2d at 1060.
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coal, the court noted a recent trend liberalizing the definition of
a coal miner.81 For example, a coal truck driver with fourteen
years experience hauling coal from the point of extraction to a
tipple,82 a clerical employee who at times relayed orders from
the office to miners at the tipple," and an employee who re-
paired mining equipment in the coal company's shop' had all
been found to be "miners" within the meaning of the Act.
Although the court held that it was error to deny the claim,
the case was remanded to determine the nature of the claim-
ant's work as a railroad employee in the proximity of a coal
mine. 5
In conclusion, although the presumption set forth in section
921(c)(1) has spawned few appellate cases, those cases speak to
both aspects of the presumption. The interim criteria contained
in the regulations in most cases permits only a mechanical
analysis of the medical evidence as seen in Sullivan." Medical
evidence either meets the interim criteria or it fails to do so. Ab-
sent contesting the arbitrary rejection of medical evidence as in
Dickson 7 or Whitman,' there is little else the claimant can do to
establish entitlement to benefits under this presumption.
On the other hand, the regulation providing a causal rela-
tionship between CWP and coal mine employment, given a
work history of at least ten years, provides an opportunity to in-
voke the presumption by establishing the requisite length of
coal mine employment. Maxey89 suggests that even when a
claimant is confronted with an adverse Social Security earning
record, the claimant's testimony and co-worker's affidavits are
admissible as "other. relevant evidence." In addition, documen-
tary proof such as company records, tax records, union records,
union dues records, birth certificates, marriage records, U.S.
Census records, pay records, and similar data may provide suffi-
"Id.
Roberts v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1975).
13 Adelsberger v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1976).
' Skipper v. Mathews, 448 F. Supp. 300 (M.D.PA. 1977).
600 F.2d at 1060.
617 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1980).
'4 590 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1979).
617 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980).
'598 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1979).
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cient evidence to entitle the claimant to the benefit of the pre-
sumption.
II. THE 30 U.S.C. SECTION 921(c)(2) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A. Purpose
Another of the original presumptions established by Con-
gress in 196990 was designed to aid survivors in establishing en-
titlement to benefits. Section 921(c)(2) provides that if the
deceased miner had worked for at least ten years in under-
ground coal mines, and died from a respirable disease, that
disease is presumed to be CWP1 1 For survivors of miners who
died prior to January 1, 1974, the interim presumption applies.2
This interim presumption may be rebutted by the Secretary of
HEW under section 921(c)(2) in the same manner in which it is
rebutted in a living miner's claim under section 921(c)(1).11
For survivors of miners who died as a result of CWP after
January 1, 1974, three regulations govern entitlement. The first
provides that if the decedent was employed for at least ten
years in coal mining and suffered from CWP, it is presumed that
his CWP arose from coal mine employment.94 Conversely, if the
survivors are unable to establish at least ten years of coal mine
employment by the decedent, they bear the burden of establish-
ing a causal relationship between his CWP and his coal mine em-
ployment.95
A widow, seeking to establish entitlement, also has the
benefit of a regulation which establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion of total disability due to CWP on the basis of medical evi-
dence.98
90 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (1970) provides: "If a deceased miner was employed for
ten years or more in one or more underground coal mines and died from a
respirable disease there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his death was due
to pneumoconiosis."
91 Id.
92 See note 14 supra.
" See text accompanying note 22 supra. See also Farmer v. Weinberger, 519
F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1975).
20 C.F.R. § 410.456(a) (1980).
- Id § (b).
20 C.F.R. § 410.454 (1980).
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Finally, there is a presumption which is unique to survivors'
claims which presumes that death was due to CWP in the case
of a miner with ten years of coal mine employment whose death
is attributed to a respirable disease. 7 Interpretation of these
presumptions has turned on several issues, including the effect
on the deceased miner's employment at the time of his death,
and whether a death certificate constitutes substantial evidence
to defeat a widow's claim.
B. Effect of Miner's Employment at Death
Farmer v. Weinberger,98 illustrates that many widows are
unable to prove that their miner husbands died from a respira-
ble disease where the miner was employed at the time of his
death. The widow of a thirty-two year old miner who had ten to
fifteen years of coal mine experience filed a claim for benefits
after his death. The decedent had complained of chest pains and
shortness of breath for approximately two years prior to his
death.9 Approximately nine months before his death, the miner
underwent a pre-employment physical examination which dis-
closed CWP. Although he was advised not to return to under-
ground coal mining, he nevertheless was hired by a coal com-
pany and was working five nights a week at the time of his
death."'0 The miner died after returning home from work, and
the death certificate listed the cause of death as a coronary oc-
clusion."°' At the hearing, the ALJ held that while the miner suf-
fered from CWP, the interim presumption of disability or death
due to CWP was rebutted since he was employed as a miner at
the time of his death.02
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, claimant countered this find-
ing by arguing that a miner can be totally disabled and continue
working from sheer determination. In ruling on the merits of
claimant's argument, the court noted that Social Security Ruling
73-36 13 provides that where there is ... sporadic work, poor
20 C.F.R. § 410.462 (1980).
519 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 628 n.2.
101 Id at 629.
Id. See also text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
103 Social Security Ruling 73-36 (1973).
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performance, and marginal earnings.. ." continued employment
might not preclude a finding of total disability."°4 Work that fits
these categories is not deemed "comparable and gainful" work
and therefore does not suffice to rebut this presumption. ' Con-
fronted with this argument, the court reviewed the ALJ's deci-
sion and determined that he had inquired into this area in his
decision. Since he had found that the work was not sporadic, the
performance not poor, and the earnings not marginal, remand
was not necessary."
Employment at the time of death may also prevent a sur-
vivor from establishing entitlement to the rebuttable presump-
tion of disability or death due to CWP. In Adkins v.
Weinberger," a widow filed a claim for survivor's benefits based
upon her husband's twenty-eight years of coal mine employ-
ment. He was employed in the mines until his death. Although
his family physician had treated him for shortness of breath,
there were no X-rays available; the physician did not mention
disability due to a respiratory impairment, and the miner had
not been ill before he died." 8 The death certificate signed by the
physician listed the cause of death as "acute coronary throm-
bosis.""1 9 Benefits were denied for two reasons. First, since the
miner was employed, the ALJ found that the miner was not
disabled. Second the medical evidence, including the death cer-
tificate, convinced the ALJ that CWP was not the cause of
death. " ' Moreover, on appeal, the court found these same facts
prevented the claimant from establishing entitlement under the
section 921(c)(4) statutory rebuttable presumption. Although the
decedent had in excess of fifteen years of coal mine employment,
there was no evidence of a totally disabling respiratory impair-
ment.'
519 F.2d at 633.
105 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1282 (3rd Cir. 1979); Everly v.
Califano, 582 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1978); Hanna v. Califano, 579 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.
1978).
519 F.2d at 633.
536 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1976).
' Id. at 115-116.
109 Id.
.o Id at 114.
'" Id at 117. See also Jackson v. Weinberger, 532 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1976)
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In some cases, continued employment at the time of death
will not preclude an award of benefits. In Everly v. Califano,"2
the miner had worked for twenty years in coal mines prior to his
death. Most of his medical records had been destroyed; and his
death certificate listed the cause of death as "a myocardial in-
farction and arteriosclerotic heart disease." ' At the hearing, his
widow testified concerning his breathing problems and the
nurse who had cared for him testified that she had administered
injections to relieve his chest pains and assist his breathing.
However, as a result of his continued employment, the ALJ
found that the miner was not disabled at the time of his death.1
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the record and found
that the deceased's Social Security records revealed a decline in
earnings. In addition, since he had encountered difficulty in per-
forming his usual work, his employer had given the deceased a
less strenuous job on a tipple.1 Relying upon the testimony of
the nurse who had cared for the miner and his declining earn-
ings records, the court held that the claimant was entitled to the,
rebuttable presumption set forth in the regulations.' Moreover,
there was insufficient medical evidence to rebut the presump-
tion."7 Thus, since the claimant had been employed for twenty
years in coal mining, there was no question that his respirable
disease was CWP arising out of his mining employment."8
C. CWP Presumed from Death Attributed to a Respirable
Disease
Smakula v. Weinberger"' is illustrative of the manner in
which a claimant demonstrates entitlement to the presumption
of death due to CWP, given ten years of coal mine employment,
and upon proof of death due to a respirable disease. In Smakula,
a widow filed a claim for benefits alleging that her husband had
worked in coal mines for forty years. While the ALJ awarded
benefits, the Appeals Council and the district court denied them.
1 582 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1978).




"I Id at 1354.
li Id.
"1 572 F.2d 127 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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In its discussion of the appeal, the Third Circuit noted that
there are three circumstances which relate to the invocation of
this presumption. First, if the cause of death is "medically
ascribed to a chronic lung disease" 120 death is ascribed to CWP.
Second, if death is due to multiple causes and the miner suffered
from CWP, death is ascribed to CWP when it is "not medically
feasible" to distinguish which disease caused death or the
degree to which each disease attributed to death.121 Finally, if
the medically ascribed cause of death is not reasonably consis-
tent with CWP, death will not be ascribed to CWP. 112
Claimant was unable to establish entitlement under the first
circumstance since death was not medically ascribed to a chronic
lung disease.1" Moreover, the second circumstances was not ap-
plicable either. With regard to whether the evidence fell within
the third circumstance, the court held that it is "not medically
feasible" to distinguish between CWP and another cause of
death where all the evidence suggests the influence of a respira-
ble disease, but it is not possible to specifically state how much
each disease contributed to the miner's death."'4 Since Smakula
had a medical history of respiratory impairment, the influence of
a respirable disease was present. Further, since no physician
had ever attributed his respiratory problem to a heart ailment,
it was impossible to specifically state the degree to which either
the heart ailment or the respiratory problem contributed to
death. Thus the regulation reciting the third circumstance was
satisfied and benefits were awarded. 25
The difficulty of proving death due to a respirable disease
when the death certificate lists another cause or other causes of
death is presented in Craig v. Weinberger.121 The evidence
showed that a miner suffered a heart attack and died as he was
" See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 410.462(b) (1980).
121 Id.
572 F.2d at 130.
' Id. at 132.
124 Id
'1 Id. at 133. For a case illustrating the inability of a widow to demonstrate
death due to a respirable death, see Farmer v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 627 (6th Cir.
1975) and text accompanying note 98 supra. See also Wallace v. Mathews, 554
F.2d 299 (6th Cir., 1977); Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054 (4th Cir., 1976);
Felthager v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 130 (10th Cir., 1976).
12 522 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1975).
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getting ready to leave for work. The death certificate, which
was signed by a physician who had never treated the miner and
who did not perform an autopsy, assigned the immediate cause
of death to coronary thrombosis. However, the medical evidence
also established, within the realm of medical probability, that
the fatal heart attack was "brought on" by CWP.In As a result,
the ALJ found that CWP was "a significant contributing cause
of death. . ." and awarded benefits."n However, the Appeals
Council reversed the award and the district court affirmed the
Appeals Council.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that the
only evidence supporting the denial of benefits consisted of the
death certificate. The physician who signed the certificate gave
no reason for his determination concerning the cause of death.
However, the death certificate did reveal the number "4201" in
a space reserved for other contributing causes of death, so the
court remanded the case for a hearing to determine the meaning
of this number.1 2 The court further stated that, except for the
possibility that "4201" might be relevant to a denial of benefits,
the claimant would have been entitled to an award of benefits
"because the only evidence to support the Secretary's contrary
decision is a negative inference that could be drawn from the
death record that does not mention a lung disorder."
130
The Third Circuit has also held a widow entitled to remand
based in part on the issue of death certificate causes of death, as
evidenced in Zielinski v. Califano.3' Zielinski filed his claim in
1971, but he was denied benefits based upon conflicting X-ray
reports, and hospital records revealing cirrhosis of the liver.
The ALJ's denial of benefits was affirmed by the Appeals Coun-
cil and the district court. While appeal was pending, the claim-
ant died. His death certificate listed the immediate cause of
death as cirrhosis of the liver and a contributing cause as "an-
thracosilicosis." Furthermore, an autopsy confirmed anthra-
cosilicosis. 32
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The issue presented to the Third Circuit was whether or not
the case should have been remanded to HEW in light of addi-
tional evidence relating to CWP which had been submitted in
support of the claimaint's motion for summary judgment at the
district court level. The district court had refused to remand the
case, since it found that there was no demonstration that the
medical reports obtained in 1974 and 1975 related to the miner's
condition on or before July 1, 1973."' The Third Circuit held that
the district court erred in refusing to remand the case in view of
the progressive, irreversible nature of CWP. Accordingly, re-
mand was ordered to enable the widow to present any additional
medical evidence adduced after the hearing."'
Thus, while the section 921(c)(2) presumption appears on its
face to be relatively simple to establish, case law suggests the
contrary. Imprecise evidence contained in death certificates as
well as a miner's employment at the time of his death may
operate to thwart an award of benefits to survivors of a miner
who may have actually died as a result of CWP.
III. THE SECTION 921(c)(3) IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A. Generally
The irrebutable presumption afforded by section 921(c))3)
had its origin in the 1969 Act" and provides entitlement to
benefits for miners suffering from complicated pneumoconiosis,
the most serious form of CWP. The presumption accrues to the
benefit of a miner who is suffering or has suffered from a
chronic dust disease of the lungs that meets certain diagnostic
standards. To be considered complicated CWP, a chest X-ray
must yield one or more large opacities (greater than 1 cen-
timeter in diameter) or a biopsy or an autopsy must show
massive lesions in the lung.136 Once such medical evidence is ad-
duced, the miner is irrebuttably presumed to be totally disabled
due to complicated CWP, or to have died from CWP, as the case
1 3 Id. at 106-107. See Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976), cert
denied 430 U.S. 985 (1977) and text accompanying note 28 supra.
'u 580 F.2d at 107.
133 See note 1 supra.
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1979). Regulations implimenting this statute may be
found at 20 C.F.R. § 410.414 (1980) and 20 C.F.R. § 410.458 (1980).
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may be,137 even if the miner is fully engaged in coal mine work or
other comparable and gainful work.1  Since this presumption is
irrebuttable once invoked, the principle issue arising under this
section is whether the medical evidence adduced is sufficient to
afford the claimant the benefit of the presumption initially.'39
The constitutionality of this irrebuttable presumption was
ruled upon favorably by the Supreme Court in Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co.,4 0 wherein the Court held that, as an opera-
tional matter, the effect of the "irrebuttable presumption" of
total disability is to establish entitlement as a matter of right
for miners who are clinically determined to be suffering from
complicated CWP. 4 While noting that Congress could have
simply provided for compensation as a matter of right rather
than phrasing the language affording entitlement in terms of an
irrebuttable presumption, the court held that since this statute
deals with "purely economic matters," Congress' choice of
language did not invalidate an otherwise permissible purpose
and effect. " 2
B. Circuit Court Rulings
Although various procedural issues governing entitlement
to benefits under the irrebuttable presumption have been ruled
upon by the Benefits Review Board1 3 there is a virtual dearth of
137 Id-
'' See, e.g., Mondragon v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., 7 BRBS 202, BRB No. 77-221
BLA (Dec. 22, 1977); Kelley v. Brookside-Pratt Mining Co., 8 BRBS 907, BRB No.
78-224 BLA (June 30, 1978).
'" See Smith, Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977-Complicated But
Simple, KY. BENCH & B., April 1979, at 20.
1 428 U.S. 1 (1976); see note 11 supra.
14 Id. at 23.
" Id. at 24-25.
14 See, e.g., Fisher v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 7 BRBS 914, BRB No. 77-151
BLA (Jan. 31, 1978) (no offset for earned wages when entitlement based on com-
plicated CWP); Shultz v. Borgman Coal Co., 6 BRBS 286, BRB No. 76-368 BLA
(June 30, 1977) (any evidence of complicated CWP must be analyzed by hearing of-
ficer and if rejected, legitimate reasons given). Even though complicated CWP is
shown to exist, it must be established that such condition arose out of coal mine
employment. See, 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1979); Carpenter v. Tennessee Consolidated
Coal Co., 9 BRBS 268, BRB Nos. 77-395 BLA and 77-395 BLA-A (may 31, 1978).
Frequently a miner may establish this fact by resort to the presumption em-
bodied in 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1976). See text accompanying notes 9-23 supra.
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case law construing this presumption emanating from the circuit
courts of appeals.144 Nevertheless, a recent decision from the
Third Circuit clarifies several issues.
In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation v. North
American Coal Corp., "I the Third Circuit added authority to
prior holdings of the Benefits Review Board 4 ' which adjudged a
claimant entitled to benefits beginning with the month in which
complicated CWP is diagnosed, notwithstanding continuing em-
ployment as a miner."7
In North American, the Director sued North American Coal
Corporation for payment of disability benefits to its former
employee, Kenneth Truitt."8 Since an X-ray, taken some ten
days before he began working for North American, revealed
complicated CWP, he would have been irrebuttably presumed
totally disabled before his employment began." 9 For that reason,
the Board ruled that Truitt's disability could not have arisen
while he worked for North American.
The Director petitioned for review in the Third Circuit argu-
ing that a finding of total disability does not preclude North
American's being liable for benefits because the employer may
have been responsible for "aggravation" of the total disability.'
However, the court dismissed the appeal, finding that this argu-
ment had not been raised during any of the agency proceedings
which preceded the appeal and, thus should not be considered at
this point absent unusual circumstances, which were not present
here.151 Accordingly, the issue of whether complicated CWP may
Apparently, once reliable medical evidence is adduced, few litigabile
issues arise in a case involving complicated CWP.
626 F.2d 1137 (3rd Cir. 1980).
", See cases cited in note 138, supra.
: 626 F.2d at 1139.
:,8 Id. at 1138.
49 Id.
'11 Id. at 1142. See also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1979)
wherein the court discounted the argument that emphysema "aggravated" by
dust exposure qualifies as CWP under statutory definitions. Id. at 1026-27 n.3.
"1 626 F.2d at 1143 citing Unemployment Compensation Commission of Ter-
ritory of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946) wherein it is stated: "A
reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it sets aside the adminis-
trative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the
Commission of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling and state
the reasons for its action."
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be "aggravated" for purposes of holding a subsequent employer
liable for benefits remains unresolved.
During the past decade, the section 921(c)(3) irrebuttable
presumption has ameliorated the economic hardship for miners
suffering from the most advanced and progressive stage of
CWP. The fact there have been few cases construing this section
is a tribute to the precision with which it was drafted.
IV. THE SECTION 921(c)(4) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A. Legislative History
Unlike the irrebuttable presumption found in section
921(c)(3) which was part and parcel of the original black lung
legislation enacted in 1969, the rebuttable presumption em-
bodied in section 921(c)(4) was enacted as part of the 1972 amend-
ments as a remedial effort designed to eliminate specific prob-
lems that had surfaced since 1969 in awarding benefits to disa-
bled miners. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor
& Public Welfare indicated that miners with disabling breathing
impairments were being denied benefits. Although they were as
severely, and often more severely, impaired than miners whose
claims were being granted the "state of the art" precluded a
definitive medical diagnosis of CWP.'52
In view of the fact that 500/0 of all miners were denied bene-
fits under the 1969 Act and since there was an absence of defini-
tive medical conclusions, Congress felt a clear need to resolve
doubts in favor of disabled miners and their survivors. 53 Section
921(c)(4) provides presumption of CWP for miners with respira-
tory or pulmonary disability, notwithstanding negative X-rays,
if they have worked for fifteen years or more in a coal mine."u
Under this rebuttable presumption, a miner employed for
fifteen years or more who is unable to qualify for the section
1 2 1972 Legislative History, supra note 15 at 2312-13. The denial rate was in
part attributable to overly restrictive interpretations of the 1969 Act rendered by
the Social Security Administration.
SId at 2315.
Id. Another section of the 1972 amendments prohibits the denial of
benefits solely on the basis of a negative chest X-ray. 1972 Amendments, supra
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921(c)(3) irrebuttable presumption because of the existence of
X-rays interpreted as negative for CWP, may nevertheless be
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of total disability or death
due to CWP if other evidence demonstrates a totally disabling
respiratory or pulmonary impairment. Congress further provided
that this presumption may be rebutted only by establishing (A)
that the miner does not or did not have CWP, or (B) his respira-
tory or pulmonary impairment did not rise out of, or in connec-
tion with, employment in a coal mine.'5' Because this section is
designed to expand the awarding of benefits,' 8 and because it
does so in very generalized terms, it is the most frequently
litigated presumption of entitlement embodied in the federal
black lung legislation. Following is a review of the issues that
have arisen under this presumption and an analysis of their
resolutions in the circuit courts.
B. Generally
As succinctly stated by the Sixth Circuit in Gastineau v.
Mathews,' 57 it is the function of the agencies administering the
benefits programs, and not the courts', to resolve conflicts in
medical evidence presented in black lung cases. Since the exper-
tise of administering agencies is afforded great deference,' vir-
tually all circuits deciding the issue have determined that the
scope of review in black lung cases is confined to determining
whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision."9
This rebuttable presumption operates on the assumption
that the claimant may have had negative X-ray interpretations
regarding CWP, '° and thus an X-ray read as positive for CWP
is, obviously, not required to invoke the presumption. However,
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1976).
i See text accompanying note 16 supra.
1 577 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1978).
SId. at 358. This is the unanimous holding of all circuits deciding the issue.
See, e.g., Shrader v. Califano, 608 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1979); Doss v. Califano,
598 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1979).
" Id. See also Seacrist v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056-57 (4th Cir. 1976);
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1972).
"o District Court opinions have split over whether an X-ray read as negative
for complicated CWP is required before a claimant is entitled to rely on the §
921(c)(4) rebuttable presumption. Compare Marlow v. Mathews, 412 F. Supp. 925
(E.D. Tenn. 1976) with Cosand v. Sec'y, HEW, 408 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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the presumption does not arise unless and until "other evi-
dence" demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling chronic
respiratory or pulmonary impairment. The Fifth Circuit has ruled
that the phrase "other evidence" is to be given its ordinary
meaning; the hearing officer may therefore take into account all
relevant evidence in determing whether disabling CWP exists,
including the claimant's own testimony."' In addition to a find-
ing that the miner spent fifteen years or more in the mines,
there must be a separate determination that the miner is suffer-
ing from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impair-
ment. As the Fourth Circuit ruled in Phillips v. Mathews,""'
fifteen years of employment in the mines, standing alone,
creates no presumption, although long years of service in the
mines is relevant in determining whether there is a totally
disabling respiratory impairment."
C. Threshold Considerations in Establishing Entitlement
Under the Rebuttable Presumption
Initially, it should be noted that a claimant will never seek
to establish entitlement under the section 921(c)(4) rebuttable
presumption where the medical evidence of record is sufficient
to afford entitlement under the so-called "interim" presumptions
of entitlement afforded by regulations issued by the Secretary
of HEW' or the Secretary of Labor. 65 However, medical test
results not falling within the evidentiary criteria employed in
those presumptions may still be indicative of a reduced ven-
tilatory capacity and, as such, may constitute "other evidence"
demonstrating the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment for purposes of the section 921(c)(4)
rebuttable presumption.' In addressing the burden of persua-
sion resting on the claimant to prove entitlement under section
"I U.S. Steel Corp. v. Bridges, 582 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1978). This test was ap-
plied and the claimant's testimony was admitted in Henson v. Weinberger, 548
F.2d 695, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1977).
12 555 F.2d 1182 (4th Cir. 1977).
1e Id. at 1183; Accord, Hale v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1977).
1I See text accompanying note 14 supra. See, e.g., McConville v.
Weinberger, 394 F. Supp. 1194 (W.D.Pa. 1975), affd without published opinion,
530 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir. 1976). See e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 (1980).
16 Id,
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921(c)(4), the Fourth Circuit explained in Petry v. Califano6 7 that
the claimant must establish both fifteen years of mine employ-
ment and adduce by a preponderance of evidence, other than
X-rays, biopsy, or autopsy reports, the existence of a totally dis-
abling chronic respiratory impairment.188 The Third Circuit has
made clear, however, that once a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment is demonstrated the claimant need not
demonstrate a causal relationship between the impairment and
"true" CWP.169
If the claimant is unable to establish either or both of these
elements, the presumption fails and the claim should be denied
insofar as it is based upon the presumption. However, if the two
elements are established from all the evidence, then the burden
of going forward with the evidence shifts to the party opposing
entitlement and he must successfully rebut the presumption in
the manner specifically outlined in the statute."' This analysis
has been validated by the Sixth Circuit in the case of Prokes v.
Mathews.171
D. Evidence Necessary to Establish Entitlement Under
the Rebuttable Presumption
The testimony of the claimant as well as those knowledge-
able about his condition, ie. lay testimony, is recognized as fall-
ing within the purview of "other evidence" necessary to es-
tablish entitlement under the section 921(c)(4) presumption."'
However, as held by the Seventh Circuit in Peabody Coal Co. v.
Director,13 entitlement to the presumption must be established
from medical evidence and not lay testimony alone.174 Moreover,
in determining whether a claimant is totally disabled by a re-
spiratory disease, primary consideration must be given to the
167 577 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1978).
16 Id. at 864. See also Barnette v. Califano, 585 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1978).
169 Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Warmus, 578 F.2d 59, 63 (3rd Cir. 1978).
..0 577 F.2d at 864. See also, text accompanying note 155 supra.
171 559 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit has also accepted
this analysis of the risk of non persuasion. See, Ohler v. Sec'y, HEW, 583 F.2d
501, 506 (10th Cir. 1978).
1 See text accompanying note 161 supra; Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 476,
477 (8th Cir. 1977); Ansel v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1976).
... 581 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1978).
17, Id at 123.
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medical severity of the disease.'7 5 For that reason, as stated by
the Fourth Circuit, great reliance is placed upon the conclusions
of a claimant's examining physician."'
Nevertheless, the precise mixture of lay and medical testi-
mony necessary to give rise to the presumption has been the
subject of much discussion by the circuit courts. In Ansel v.
Weinberger,'7' the Sixth Circuit found that presumption invoked
by testimony from the claimant's physician coupled with the lay
testimony of the plaintiff, his wife, and a co-worker .1 8 On a
lesser evidentiary showing, the Seventh Circuit in Henson v.
Weinberger,7 1 afforded the presumption to a miner merely on
the basis of his testimony coupled with that of his examining
physician, stating "the testimony of Mr. Henson and Dr. Peters
make out a prima facie case of a respiratory or pulmonary im-
pairment, totally disabling from coal mine or comparable
work.""' The Eighth Circuit, following Henson, held the
presumption to have been raised by the testimony of a physi-
cian, the claimant, and the claimant's wife.18'
The most abbreviated showing of entitlement is found in the
Sixth Circuit decision in Prokes v. Mathews.8' Although the
decision merely affirms the judgment of the district court grant-
ing summary judgment and remanding to the Social Security
Administration for further proceedings, the Sixth Circuit in-
dicated that the claimant might have been able to establish en-
titlement to the presumption merely on the basis of his own
testimony coupled with a note from his physician.'83 The note
stated that claimant suffered from bronchitis and pulmonary
emphysema, but did not conclude that he was totally disabled.
The court opined that if an additional note stated that the claim-
ant was totally disabled "this would be significant evidence to
15 Id.
"I See, e.g., King v. Califano, 615 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980); Hubbard v.
Califano, 582 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 1978). The Sixth Circuit views treating physi-
cians' conclusions in the same manner. See, e.g. Caraway v. Califano, 623 F.2d 7
(6th Cir. 1980).
'" 529 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1976).
,7 Id at 309-10.
548 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1977).
' Id at 698.
,' Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
559 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977).
"= Id. at 1059.
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be considered in determining whether he was entitled to the
presumption . .."' Reading these rulings from the Sixth,
Seventh and Eighth Circuits consistently, it appears that, at a
minimum, the testimony of the claimant, coupled with that of his
examining physician will give rise to section 921(c)(4) rebuttable
presumption.1"
Circuit Court rulings have also evidenced a divergence of
opinion with respect to whether a physician must make an ex-
press finding of total disability in order to give rise to the pre-
sumption. Although earlier holdings from the Fourth18 and
Sixth18 Circuits appear to support the notion that an affirmative
finding of total disability must be made, a recent decision from
the Sixth Circuit, Miniard v. Califano88 discounts this view. On
the strength of the claimant's testimony concerning constant
coughing, shortness of breath, smothering and the inability to
"hold out" all day, coupled with physicians' finding of pulmonary
and respiratory impairments,89 the court held that Miniard
"presented sufficient evidence of chronic respiratory or pulmon-
ary impairment to be considered totally disabled within the
meaning of the statute."190 While Miniard may indicate a trend
within the Sixth Circuit, it remains to be seen whether the
Fourth Circuit will abandon its requirement that a physician's
statement concluding total disability is a necessary prerequisite
to invocation of the section 921(c)(4) presumption.91
I"' Id
I In Hoffman v. Califano, 450 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1978) the court analyzed
these cases and came to the conclusion that testimony from an additional lay
witness in addition to that of the miner and his physician would have been
necessary to give rise to the presumption. Id at 1328. This may not be a required
result but merely a recognition that rarely does the living miner come to an
eligibility hearing without the aid of at least one other lay witness.
See, e.g., Barnette v. Califano, 585 F.2d 698, 699 (4th Cir. 1978).
Ansel v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1976). Singleton v.
Califano, 591 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1979) (rebuttable presumption afforded partly on
the basis of an examining physician's conclusion of total disability).
18 618 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 407-08.
Id at 409.
" In the event a treating physician fails to make an affirmative statement
respecting the degree of claimants disability, the attorney for the claimant may
wish to request the ALJ to submit interrogatories on this point to such physician.
Compare Artrip v. Califano, 569 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978) (request denied) with
Phillips v. Mathews, 412 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Va. 1976) (request permitted).
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E. Defeating the Operation of the Rebuttable Presumption
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Singleton v. Califano '92
demonstrates the mechanisms utilized by the Social Security
Administration in denying the operation of the section 921(c)(4)
rebuttable presumption.
The first such mechanism is the use of negative X-ray inter-
pretations and pulmonary function studies which are insufficient
to afford entitlement to benefits under the interim presump-
tions of entitlement. '93 Since the landmark case of Ansel 9' the
Sixth Circuit has held that such negative medical evidence is in-
sufficient to demonstrate that a miner does not have CWP in the
face of testimony from- a claimant's examining physician that he
is totally disabled from coal mine employment. Accordingly, in
such a case, negative X-rays and non-qualifying pulmonary func-
tion studies are insufficient to rebut the section 921(c)(4)
presumption. 95 Where the presumption has been afforded partly
on the basis of a medical opinion, Ansel holds that is can only be
rebutted by a medical opinion that the claimant does not have
CWP.19' Nevertheless, the Social Security Administration fre-
quently argues that negative X-rays and non-qualifying pulmon-
ary function studies, while insufficient to rebut the presumption,
constitute "other evidence" which militates against a finding
that a claimant has a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary
impairment. This analysis prevents a claimant from falling
within the purview of the statutory presumption in the first
place. The viability of this argument was laid to rest by the
Sixth Circuit in Singleton.
As in Ansel, the Social Security Administration in Singleton
relied upon negative X-rays and non-qdalifying pulmonary func-
tion studies to counteract the diagnosis, rendered by the claim-
ant's examining physician, which concluded that he suffered
112 591 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1979).
I" See text accompanying notes 164-65 supra.
' 529 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1976).
,g Id. at 310. Indeed, the existence of negative X-rays is the premise upon
which this statutory presumption is afforded.
I" Id. See also Morris v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977). This holding
of Ansel is uniform among the circuits that have ruled on this issue. See, e.g.,
Petry v. Califano, 577 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1978); Gober v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 772
(3rd Cir. 1978); Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1977); Henson v.
Weinberger, 548 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1977).
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from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 9 7
However, ruling that the examining physician's statement out-
weighed such negative test results, the Sixth Circuit held that
the physician's conclusion constituted "other evidence" which
did demonstrate a totally disabling pulmonary impairment, thus
entitling Singleton to the benefit of the presumption. 9' In light
of Ansel, the presumption, once afforded, could only be rebutted
by a negative report from an examining physician, not merely
negative test results. Therefore, Singleton's claim was properly
remanded for an award of benefits.
A second mechanism utilized to defeat the operation of the
rebuttable presumption was also considered by the court in
Singleton. In weighing a claimant's evidence, ALJ's are influenced
by Social Security Ruling 73-37 which provides that where
X-rays or pulmonary function tests fail to meet the medical cri-
teria required for application of the interim presumption, 99
there is an inference that the miner is not totally disabled. Thus,
the Social Security Administration relies heavily on negative
X-rays and nonqualifying pulmonary function studies while dis-
counting the testimony of examining physicians in making a de-
termination.
However, to interpret this ruling as allowing the exclusion
of other relevant evidence whenever negative X-rays or non-
qualifying pulmonary function studies are present is to convert
to the "inference" allowed by the Ruling into a nonallowable pre-
sumption that the claimant is not disabled."' Such misplaced
faith in this Ruling was criticized, but not invalidated, by the
,17 591 F.2d at 385.
~ Id.
19 See note 14 supra.
o 591 F.2d at 385, citing Social Security Ruling 73-37 (1973). The Sixth Cir-
cuit first encountered this Ruling in Prokes, wherein the ALJ had applied the
Ruling, and based a denial of the application of the § 921(c)(4) presumption on the
existence of negative X-ray interpretations and pulmonary function studies while
ignoring evidence of total disability tendered by the claimant's treating physician.
559 F.2d at 1060. To this extent, Singleton is a carbon copy of Prokes. Thus,
Prokes held that to the extent that the ruling "recognizes an inference which
logically flows from consideration of proven facts, it does no violence to the Act."
Id at 1062. However, the use of the Ruling to limit the ability of a miner to
establish entitlement to benefits by means of "other evidence" constitutes error
and renders the § 921(c)(4) rebuttable presumption a nullity.
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Court in Singleton."' Thus while the Sixth Circuit has joined the
Third Circuit in criticizing Social Security Ruling 73-37,202 the
court continues to be besieged by cases where it is misapplied."3
This deluge may ultimately cause the Sixth Circuit to join the
Fourth"0 4 and the Eighth0 5 Circuits in invalidating the Ruling in
its entirety. As a consequence of Ansel, buttressed by Singleton,
the operation of the section 921(c)(4) presumption can neither be
denied, nor rebutted, by negative medical tests at least where a
claimant alleges a totally disabling pulmonary impairment on
the basis of a report from an examining physician.
The extent to which such negative evidence may be utilized
as "other evidence" for purposes of this statutory presumption,
even though it would not qualify the claimant for the benefit of
the interim or statutory irrebuttable presumption, remains to
be analyzed. The resolution of this issue may in part depend
upon determining the point at which nonqualifying studies are
no longer relevant to the issue of whether the claimant has a
totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment. A pul-
monary function study may not yield test values low enough to
qualify for the interim presumption, yet those values may be
close enough to the criteria employed in that presumption to in-
dicate a reduced ventilatory capacity. In such event, "negative"
test results insufficient to afford a claimant the benefit of the in-
terim presumption would tend to support the allegation that the
claimant suffers from a totally disabling respiratory and pulmon-
ary impairment. These "negative" test results constitute "other
evidence" to support rather than defeat the application of the
section 921(c)(4) rebuttable presumption to a claim.00
' 591 F.2d at 385.
See Gober v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 772, 777-78 (3rd Cir. 1978); Schaaf v.
Mathews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3rd Cir. 1978).
m See, e.g. Caraway v. Califano, 623 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980); Maddox v.
Califano, 601 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1979); Cunningham v. Califano, 590 F.2d 635 (6th
Cir. 1978).
*u See Hubbard v. Califano, 582 F.2d 319, 325-26 (4th Cir. 1978).
25 See Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
Several courts have recognized this utility of "negative" test results. See
Hoffman v. Califano, 450 F. Supp. 1313, 1324 (E.D.Pa. 1978); Henson v.
Weinberger, 548 F.2d 695, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1977); Stefanowicz v. Mathews, 443 F.
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Conversely, "negative" test results may so greatly exceed
the test values employed in the interim presumption as to in-
dicate the nonexistence of a totally disabling pulmonary or re-
spiratory impairment. In that event, an inference that the miner
is not suffering from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmon-
ary impairment can logically be drawn and Social Security Rul-
ing 73-37 appears applicable. Test results neither greatly ex-
ceeding, nor closely approximating, the test criteria employed in
the interim presumption would seem to have little probative
value. " To date, however, the circuit courts have declined to
more precisely define the category of cases to which the Ruling
is properly applied.
F. Rebuttal of the Presumption
The presumption afforded by section 921(c)(4) may be rebut-
ted only by establishing that the miner does not or did not have
CWP, or that his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not
arise out of, or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."8
Rebuttal by showing that the miner does not or did not have
CWP was addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Ansel."' That court
held that where the claimant has demonstrated entitlement to
the presumption on the basis of a medical opinion indicating the
existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impair-
ment, the presumption can be rebutted only by the production
of a medical opinion that the claimant does not have CWP. 1
Since the opinions of treating physicians are afforded great
weight,11 it would appear that a medical opinion indicating the
nonexistence of CWP would have to be based upon an examina-
tion of the claimant in order to be sufficiently probative to rebut
the presumption."' Thus while Ansel rules that mere negative
See Hubbard, 582 F.2d at 321, wherein it is stated that inconclusive or
contradictory results of X-rays inure to the benefit of neither party.
"' See text accompanying note 155 supra.
529 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1976).
210 Id at 310.
211 See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
212 The Tenth Circuit, without deciding the issue expressed doubts as to
whether the opinions of two physicians indicating the non existence of CWP
would be sufficiently probative to rebut the presumption where neither physician
examined the claimant and both opinions were based on an inconclusive autopsy.
See Felthager v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 130, 132-33 (10th Cir. 1976).
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X-rays standing alone are insufficient to rebut the presumption,
the Fifth Circuit has made clear that a medical opinion as to the
nonexistence of CWP may properly be based upon negative
X-rays and, despite Ansel, could suffice to rebut the presump-
tion."13
To rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the totally
disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not
arise out of or in connection with coal mine employment, the
Benefits Review Board has ruled that this finding must be made
with a reasonable degree of medical certainty.' Thus, as ex-
plained by the Eighth Circuit, the mere possibility of an in-
tervening cause is sufficient to rebut the section 921(c)(4)
presumption.15
The Fourth Circuit has recently examined whether evidence
that the claimant suffered from lung cancer will suffice to
demonstrate that his totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory
impairment did not arise out of or in connection with his coal
mine employment. In Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Fleming,18 the im-
mediate cause of claimant's death was listed as lung cancer, but
a subsequent autopsy disclosed "moderate anthracocis, bilateral
(consistent with simple coal workers pneumoconiosis). '"17 The
claimant's treating physician testified that CWP was the cause
of the respiratory impairment that disabled Fleming, that such
condition predisposed Fleming to lung cancer and that lung can-
cer was a mere contributing factor to death. Claimant's em-
ployer, Clinchfield, was unable to produce medical evidence that
the claimant's CWP did not predispose him to lung cancer. Ac-
cordingly, the employer was precluded from demonstrating that
the claimant's respiratory impairment did not arise out of his
coal mine employment. 8
"I3 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Put-
sakulish v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 192, 196 (W.D. Pa. 1978) wherein the court held
that a medical opinion based only upon a negative X-ray cannot rebut the
presumption particularly where that opinion is based on an X-ray which other
readers found unreadable.
"' See, e.g., Blevins v. Peabody Coal Co., 9 BRBS 510, BRB No. 78-406 BLA
(Dec. 29, 1978).
" Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
, 606 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1979).
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In Rose v. Clinchfield Coal Co.,219 on virtually the same facts
as presented in Fleming, the court reversed a Benefits Review
Board decision denying benefits. The Board found the claimant
was not entitled to the section 921(c)(4) presumption because the
survivor had failed to demonstrate any causal relationship be-
tween the miner's cancer and CWP or between cancer and his
coal mine employment. As a result of the parties' agreement and
the Board's finding that claimant's husband also suffered from
CWP, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the respondent employer
bore the burden of ruling out any cause of relationship between
the miner's cancer and CWP; the claimant is not required to de-
monstrate such a causal relationship in order to show entitle-
ment to the presumption. Since the only testimony presented
was equivocal with respect to whether cancer could have arisen
from previously existing CWP, the respondent employer did not
carry its rebuttal burden and benefits were ultimately
awarded."0
Thus, while Ansel fairly well settled the manner in which
the nonexistence of CWP may be demonstrated, case law is still
developing with respect to the manner in which the causal link
between a demonstrated respiratory impairment and coal mine
employment may be broken. If Rose and Fleming are an indica-
tion, one can surmise that the results in the cases will be as
varied as the medical opinions on the issue of whether CWP pre-
disposes one to lung cancer.
V. THE SECTION 921(c)(5) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
A. Generally
Even after the 1972 amendments had been implemented,
certain inequities remained. Many eligible widows did not re-
ceive the benefit payments envisioned by Congress because
they could not meet the Act's strict criteria for eligibility. The
Congress heard testimony that superhuman efforts were re-
quired to enable a widow to reconstruct the work records or
medical records necessary to meet eligibility requirements."'
219 614 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id at 938-39.
=1 Black Lung Benefits Reform Act and Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of
1977, House Committee on Education and Labor, Committee Print, February,
1979, (hereinafter, 1977 Legislative History) at 221.
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Benefits were being denied because of an absence of medical
records; because the miner's death certificate listed a disease
other than pneumoconiosis as the cause of death; or because, in
order to provide a means of support for his wife and children,
the miner was still employed at the time of his death.' Con-
gress therefore made a conscious effort to ease the survivors'
burden in establishing entitlement by enacting the rebuttable
presumption contained in section 921(c)(5).
Under this provision, survivors are presumed to be entitled
to benefits if the miner had been employed for at least twenty-
five years in one or more coal mines prior to June 30, 1971 and
died on or before March 1, 1978.1 This presumption may be re-
butted only by establishing that, at the time of death, the miner
was not partially or totally disabled by CWP."4
Since the presumption shifts the burden of proof from the
survivors to those contesting the award, it has met with opposi-
tion from employers who are liable for benefit payments. Most
often, the employer challenges the constitutionality of the pre-
sumption.2 5 As yet there is no case law from the courts of ap-
peals ruling on the constitutionality of this presumption. Pre-
sumptions in civil statutes involving ec6nomic legislation are
tested for their constitutionality against the rational connection
standard expounded in Mobile Jackson & Kansas City Railroad
v. Turnipseed. Thus, given a standard which requires only that
Id. at 1233-34. See text accompanying notes 98-118 supra.
Reform Act, supra note 7 at § 3(a)(5) [codified at 30 U.S.C § 921(c)(5)
(1979)].
22 Id Note that this section permits compensation for survivors of miners
who were partially disabled. The regulations issued pursuant to this section are
contained in 20 C.F.R. § 727.204 (1980) and provide that a miner will be considered
partially disabled if he had a reduced ability to engage in his usual coal mine work
or gainful work requiring comparable skills or abilities. See also 20 C.F.R. §
718.306 (1980) and for total disability 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b) (1980).
For an example of typical arguments raised by the employer, see,
Employer's Brief in Sallie Williams, Widow of Martin Williams, Deceased v.
South East Coal Co. and Director, OWCP, Benefits Review Board No. 80-609,
BLA (pending).
219 U.S. 35, 37 (1910), where the court stated:
... [T]hat a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another
may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some ra-
tional connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
19811
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there be some rational connection between the fact proved
(years of mine employment) and the ultimate fact presumed (par-
tial or total diability due to CWP), this provision will ultimately
be affirmed. Numerous studies of living miners have demon-
strated that the probability of a coal miner contracting CWP in-
creases sharply with the age of the miner and the number of
years he is exposed to coal dust.' More reliable autopsy evi-
dence confirms this relationship. Data collected from autopsies
at the Appalachian Laboratory for Occupational Respiratory Di-
seases showed that 840/0 of the miners examined had CWP.
28
"When these autopsies were arranged by years worked under-
ground, there was a sharp increase in the percentage of cases
after fifteen years, with those with less than fifteen years
underground showing 64% with CWP and those with more than
fifteen years underground showing 88/o with CWP."' Thus, a
rational relationship being present, this presumption should
pass the scrutiny of constitutional challenges.
B. Rebuttal of the Presumption
The presumption afforded survivors by section 921(c)(5) may
be rebutted only by establishing that, at the time of his death,
the miner was not either partially or totally disabled by CWP. 211
The regulations promulgated pursuant to this section clearly
reflect the Congressional intent to provide benefits despite the
existence of some adverse evidence. 23l
and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so
unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not,
under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to
preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main
fact thus presumed.
I See, e.g., Hyatt, et al. "Respiratory Disease in Southern West Virginia
Coal Miners." 89 THE AMERICAN REviEw OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 387 (1964);
Jacobson, "Evidence of Dose-Response Relation of Pneumoconiosis, (2)", 22
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 88 (U.K., 1972):
Lainhart, et al. PNEUMOCONIOSIS IN APPALACHIAN, BITUMINOUS COAL MINERS,
(1969); Morgan, et al. "The Prevalence of Coal Workers Pneumoconiosis in U.S.
Coal Miners" 27 AacmvEs OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 221 (1973), cited in 1977
Legislative History, supra note 221 at 189-90.
1977 Legislative History, supra note 221 at 184.
id.
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(5) (1979).
21 20 C.F.R. § 727.204 (1980).
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Once the survivor has proven that (a) the deceased miner
was employed for at least twenty-five years prior to June 30,
1971, (b) the employment was in one or more coal mines,"2 and (c)
death occurred prior to March 1, 1978, the burden shifts to the
operator to establish by all relevant evidence' that the miner
was not totally or partially disabled by CWP at the time of his
death.
The burden of rebutting this presumption is a heavy one.
The evidence must demonstrate either (a) that the miner's ability
to perform his usual and customary work or "comparable and
gainful work" was not reduced at the time of death, or (b) that
the miner did not have CWP. 4 The task is made more difficult
inasmuch as the regulations establish certain factors which,
standing alone, are not sufficient to rebut the presumption. 5
Evidence that the deceased miner was employed in a coal mine
at the time of death will not, alone, suffice. 6 Likewise, evidence
pertaining to his level of earnings prior to death is insufficient,
standing alone, to rebut the presumption.3 Moreover, neither a
chest X-ray interpreted as negative for CWP nor a death cer-
tificate which makes no mention of CWP will, alone, be adequate
to overcome this presumption.'
While this regulation provides that any one of these factors
considered by itself is insufficient evidence to rebut the section
921(c)(5) presumption, it does not provide guidance in predicting
what will constitute sufficient evidence. That decision will be
left to the courts.
CONCLUSION
While the cases decided by the circuit courts have settled a
plethora of evidentiary issues, significant questions remain.
Among these are the extent to which demonstrated lung cancer
is sufficient to negate a causal connection between a totally
See discussion accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
20 C.F.R. § 727.205 (1980). All relevant evidence includes circumstances of
employment and statements by the miner's spouse.
20 C.F.R. § 727.204(c) (1980).
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disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment and coal mine
employment. In addition, the circuit courts will ultimately have
to rule upon the constitutionality of the presumption employed
in section 921(c)(5) as well as the amount and kind of evidence
necessary to demonstrate partial disability due to CWP.
Although it can be argued that the availability of the
various interim presumptions of entitlement obviated the
necessity for relying on the statutory presumptions of entitle-
ment to obtain benefits, 9 claims filed after March 30, 1980, are
adjudicated under permanent medical standards without the
benefit of any interim presumptions. The primary change accom-
plished by these permanent medical standards is to shift the
burden back to the claimant to prove that he has CWP and that
he as a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment as
a result of that disease.240 Thus the various circuit court deci-
sions construing the statutory presumptions have a present via-
bility notwithstanding the fact that most of those decisions rule
upon claims filed prior to June 30, 1973.
As cases reviewed by the Benefits Review Board begin to
undergo judicial scrutiny in the circuit courts, there will be fur-
ther amplification of existing rulings on the statutory presump-
tions and resolution of issues yet to be raised.
I See, e.g. J. McClaugherty and J. Query, "Federal Black Lung claims Ad-
ministration under the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977"', EASTERN
MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE (1980)
at 12-7.
110 Id. at 12-11.
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